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The Definition of Partnership.
-000------
"The attempt to define a partnershlp haR been
made by very many people, and some of the attem pts are
collected together in the well-known book of Mr. Lind-
ley. . . . He gives fifteen i-fI~e-rt definitions of
partnership by different learned lawyers : I think no
two of themi exactly agree, but there is considerable
agreement among them ; and I suppose anybody reading
the fifteen may gfbt a general notion of what a partner-
ship means." Jessel, M. R. in Pooley v. Driver, 5 Oh.
Div. 471.
A definition is at most but a test. In determin-
Ing what constitutes a partnership, a definition of
a partnership is of little value. et every text-book
writer on the subject, except the greateRt, has con-
.ztructed a definition ; soit may be well to consider
some of them.
There are two prominent iNew York definitions.
The Civil Code, Sec. 12839 contains the following
"Partnership is the association of two or more persons
for the purpose of carryingq on business toffether, and
dividing its profits between them." Kent in his Commen-
tarieg, Vol. S,p. 23, gives this : 'Partnership is a
contract of two or more competent persons to place their
money, effects, labour, and skill, or some or all of
them, in lawful commerce or business, and to divide the
profit and bear the loss in certain proportions." Mr.
Justice Lindley critices, them in being *toowide; " for,"
"they include not only partnerships in the proper sense
of' the word, but also many corporations and companies
which differ from partnerships in several Important re-
spects." Lindley or Partnersnip,1,4. These defini-
tions are also criticised in Ponley v. Driver, r fh.Diw
4-8.
Pollock In his "DigTest of' the La' of' Partnership"
(ed. of 1890), Pt vi,,leq 3 and 4. say. : "Kent'- def'i-
nition , the most busine,,s-like, and I still think
it wag subgtantially n, ccurateand might well have been
accepted ;,ith more or leqs verbal condensation and am-
endment. T-e 'efinition ,iven bY the Indian Contrqct
Act, Sec. 329, is Kent's in a more concise form, and
runs as follows : Partnership is the relation which sub-
sistR between persons vho have agreed to combine their
property. labour or skill in some business, and to share
the profits thereof between them.'' Kent's definition
,peak- of part,-ership 9s a contract ; the Indian Contract
Pict, as a contr.,ct relation. Is not this difference
of terms a substantial difference between them?
To neet all criticisms, Pollock proposes the follow.
ing definition :"Partnership is the relation which sub-
, F4 t between per soi1 who have agTreed to share the
profit- of a business carried on by all or any of' them.
This is the best. It embodies the irinciple of the
leading modern English case of Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. of
L.268, ',,rhiechwhile it has influenced the courts of o evv
York, is not controlliriq ; so, perhaps, this definition
may not be satisfactory in this State.
It may seem a reflection on the preceding pages to
add that the great authority, Lindley, does not attempt
a definition.
The Ouetion is One of Law.
What constitutes a partnership i a question of
law for the court :Compqtoit v. McNair, 1 Wend. 457 ;
whi , the quecstion 9,q to the constituent elements of
a partnership i- one of fact for the jury :Meriden
Nat. Bank v. Gallaudet, 122 ,q. Y. 655.
The question a- to what constitutes a partnership
cornes before the court in two ways : first, where one
person qeeks to establish the rights of a partner
against another ; and secondly, where a creditor seeks
to fix the liabilities of a partner on a person in
some way connected with a business to which he has
aiven credit. In the first instance the question is
whether there is 9, partnership in fact ; it, the qecond,
w Ahether there is q pn.rtnership as to third persons.
If i be admitted that there is such a relation as a
partnership as to third persons, the first relation may
6
be correctl i ,eRcribed a. a partnerhi p between part-
nI e r q.
Partnership between Partners.
Partnership i- 1 contract relation. -U ai!greement
of' partnership, like any other contr,?,ct, must he found-
ed on a consideration either of mutual promises or con-
tributions. Mutual promises are ,ufficient. See Oole-
man v. Eyre, 45 N. Y. 38, wherelr it was held,that,
where "irn conqiterqtion of the aqreement bv the plain-
tif's to account to the defendent for half of' the profits
in caqe of succesq, the defendent undertook to bearhalf
the loqs in the contrary event, there wa. a partnership
between the parties." 4 partnership is never created
between parties b implication or operation of law,,-
part from an expresRed or implied intention and aqree-
ment to constitute the relation.
To determine whether the relption between personR
conti tteq a partnerRhip, tri r intention i n forminfg
it (Toverng. When the fqct , are gTiven the question i f
ole o," law. Thie intention of the parties .kill be de-
termined from the effect of' the whole contract, regard-
les of' special expressions.
'Whether two ,)r more persons are partners as, be-
tween themselves, is determinable chiefly br A, reference
to their orn intention." Salter v. Ham, 31 '\T. Y. 327,
328. This is the leading cage. Salter loaned to Ham
five hundred dollars for a term upon security ; and by
way of indemnity for the use of the money, it was agreed
that it should be invested in ingnredientsq for manufact-
urlnr a medici)-,e(a business which Ham was tnen carrying
on), and upon.the manufacture and sale of the article,
if any profits accrued over and above the expenges of
manuf'-cturing and selling, Salter was to receive one-
fourth of ,uci profits. The court -ays : "%ieither
in terms nor by implication is, any partnergsuip relation
8
created b hetween themsel ves. .... T. .The agreement was a
merb arranrement for a loan, upon security fnr a fixed.
period, with profits byv wav of interest. It did not
impose upon the plaintiff tne duties or clothe him
with the powers of a partner. There wa-s no joint own-
ershin of the p2,rtnership funds accl)rdinT to the inten-
tion of the parties. The 4'.900. loaned under the a-
greement a not a contribution to the capital of the
firm as such, nor wa.s it put into the business at the
risk of the husiness. The plaintiff w ,., in no event,
to participate in the losses of the adventure. ith
respect to third per,-ns, Salter might be held to be
a partner in the particular transaction, but as between
him.self and Ham the relition waq that of debtor and
creditor."
In Wyclcof'f v. Anthony, 9 )aly 428, the judge says:
"A mere community of interest in property, or an agree-
rient siriply to divide pofits, or an aqreement to bear
9
a certain part of the lo.-.es, does not necessarily, of
Itself, create the relation of partners. ,'7natever may
be the effect of the act of parties having a co-nrnunity
of interest in property, or agreeing to divide tne pro-
fits arisinq fro.m it, or to bear a part of the losses,
as respects the rights of third persons, they cannot,
as between themselves, be made to assume a relation to
eac* ther which they did not intend, because a part-
renship_in ar__.s can result only fron the intention of
the parties, to be gT!ithered from the contract, if there
be one ; or, if not, from their relations to atd deal-
inrR qsith the property and iith each~other. To consti-
tute it, there must be a joint interest in the property;
a rijht to Rhare the profits of the adventure, and a
ri'iht of control over the property or business, all of
which, in the absence of a special contract, are neces-
,arvr elements to create a partnership, as between the
parties."
10
Uice-Chancellor Cardner in Chaie v. Barrett r1883)
4 Paiae 154, says : "The principle parvades all the
cases that can be found upon the subject that there
nust be a mutual interest in the capital, ihether it
consists in money, labour or credit, as well as share
in the profits, to constitute a partnersg1ip between the
parties." And the Chancellor saidp.160 : "To consti-
tute a partnership as between the partieq themselves,
there must be a joint ownership of the partnership
funds , accordinq to the intention of the parties ; and
an agreement either express or implied, to participate
in the profits and losses of the business., either rat-
ably or in Rome other proportion to be fixed upon by
the copartners."
In MosR v. Jerome, 10 Boshworth 220, several per-
sons enraged in an enterprise, one of them agreeing to
assist by advancing money, and to share in the losqes,
if any, but not to receive any part of the profits,
11
which were to be divided arnong the others exclusivelV.
Held, that such one is not, to be deemed a rartner,
between the others and himself ; for. "the arrangement
between them lacked the communion of profits without
which a partnership inter sese cannot exist."
"To constitute persons partners as between them-
Relves, there must be an interest in the profits, as
]profits, ; each party must by the agreement partici-
pate in Rome way in the losses as well as in the pro-
fits ; an agreement to divide the gross earnings as in
this case, does not constitute the parties to it part-
ners." Pattison v. Blanchard, 5 'T.Y. 186. Here sever-
al persons were entfaged in running a line of stages,
and by the agreement between them, one was to run at
his own expense a certain portion of the route, and
the others in like manner, the residue ; each author-
ized to receive fare from the passenqers over the whole
or any part of the route ; the parties to -ettle month-
ly, and the fares so received to he divided between
then in proportion to tile distance which they respect-
ively transported such passenrers ; the party found to
have received more than his share to pay over to the
other the balance on each Ynonthl.i settlement. Held,
that this lid not constitute a partnership a-, between
the parties. "ieither party had by the terms of the
contract, any interest in or control over the stock or
road of the other ; nor were any expenses upon any
part of the route to be borne jointly. The question
of their liability to third persons is not here in-
volved. In such a cage a different rule prevails from
the one which deternines whether persons as between
themselves are partners.*
Rapallo, J. in Baldwin v. Burrows, 47 i.Y. 203,
q ks : "To constitute a partnership there must be a
reciprocal agreement of the parties not onlT to unite
their stock but to share in the risks of irofit or
13
loss bV the disposition to be made of it. vfhere sevOer-
al parties agree to purchase personal property in the
name of one of then, and to take aliquot share- of the
purchase 'ithout agreeing to resell jointly, there is
no partnershin ; (and) though goodA be bougTht by several,
under an agreement to hold in aliquot shares, but with
the intention of subsequently forming a copartner-hip
in respect to them, yet, untilthe partnership agree-
ment is actually made, the purchaserg are not copart-
ners, but only tenants in common."
An important case is that of Clift v. Barrow, 108
N.Y. 187. Pardee and lift entered into a written a-
qr(-ement to the effect that Pardee migTht use the name
of Olift in the firm of kPardee , Co. in the business of
banking ; "that Clift was not to participate in the
profits or losseq of said firm except that he was to
have for his share of the profits ten per cent. per
annum for all deposit-s he may make in the office."
14
Pardee a] -,o coventnted to keep Olift harmlegs, from all
los,ses. debts, dues or demand,, that may come against
the firm, and upon the dissolution of the firm Pardee
was to return to Clift all of his deposits, with the
ten per cent. per annum. In an action by Clift as sur.
viving partner upon a promiscorv note -lleged to have
beet! (iven to the firm, it appeared that Pardee and
plaintiff did business under and in pursuance of the
agreement until the death of Pardee and that the note
formed part of the assets. Peckha-n, J. Raid : "In
the first place the intention to form a partnership
seema to be plain. . . The plaintiff contributes to
the firm his name and his liability to pay the debts
thereof. . . LookinT at the whole instrument it fails
to show that plaintiff is not to participate in the
profitg ; but the languagfe used is sinply another way
of expressing the idea that the profits which Clift
is to be entitled to from this firm are to be measured
15
by the anount of ten per cent. upon such deposits as
he ma T from time to tiine make in the banking house.
P, condition of there being profit.s is attached to the
payment of the ten per cent., botri during the exist-
ence of the firm and subsequent to the dissolution."
It was according]y held that the agreement, when acted
upon, formed a valid partnership between the parties ;
that the agreement to pay the percenta~fe was not abso-
lute but conditional upon there being profits to that
amount from which the payment could be made, and what-
ever sum the plaintiff became entitled to under it was
pag bIe to him as profits ; that plaintiff became lia-
ble for losses or debts from the moment the agreement
was siqned qnd business done under it ; that the coven-
ant against losses and. debts _ia-, not one to prevent
such liability, but merely one of indemnity.
"Two or more persons owninq a ship. hold the same
as tenants in common, and not as partners, unless they
13
chance to be Teneral partners, and have the ship a, a
part of' their partner;hip propertr, and for partnership
purposes. But there may be a special partnership be-
tween them in respect to the ship, op particular voy-
aues and adventures in its emplovrnent and use. And
whenever a aenera] partnership, embracing the owner-
ship of the ve ssel and the business in which she is
enTared, or a particular partnership either in respect
to the ship or a particular voya(Te or adventure exists,
all the rules applicable to ordinary partnerships ap-
ply, and the riThts and liabilities of' the copartners
are the same as in merchantile o~other business co-
partnerships, . . . The distinction which takes the
property in ships and vessels oiit of the ordinary
rule- of' joint ownership of goods and merchandise is
well established and may not be departed from, but the
owners of a ship holding and owninj it as tenants in
cosson, may become partners a, common carriers of (Toods
upon that ship, with all the riTht. and liabilities
Incident to that relation, and the rmle which regulates
the riqTnt. of o%+rners in corn!non of' veF-,els, in their use
and emploinent, ouijht not to be exten4ed upon any re-
!inernent, so ac unnecessarily to cornplicate the law of
partnersip." Allen, J., in vlilliamq v. La-wrence, 47
4. Y. 46 2.
In N at. Bank r. Van Derwerker, 74 i'T.Y. 234, 239,
which was an action brouqTht aqainst the shareholders
in a joint-qtoc: acsociation which exisbed under an
oral contract, the court remarked that "as to partner-
ships, aitnouri to endure for a longer period than a
year, it has been held that thev are not within the
qtatute of frauds. Smith v. Tarlton, 2 Barb. Ch. 336".
The ChanceiloT in that case, Raid : "In this State no
written articles are necessary to constitute a copart-
nership which is to take effect imrediatly, although a
written afreement might be necegacy to bind the par-
18
ties to enter into a future copartneruhip to commence
after the expiration of a vear." In Wahl v. Barnum,
113 \T.Y. 37, it waq held, that "a contract forming a
partnership to be continued beyoni one year, is within
the section of the statute of frauds which provides
that every agreement which by its terms is not to be
performed in one ve ,r from the making thereof, is void
unles it Is in writinG, and a partnership so formed is
a partnership at will."
In King v. BarneR, 109 T.Y. 285, it is said :"The
validity of a parol agreement between parties to engage
in the business of buginTi and sellinq lands, and that
it is not open to the objection that it violateS the
statute of frauds was expressly decided by this court
in the base of Chester v. Dickinson, F4 NT.Y. 1." In
the latter case It wag held that a partnership may
exist between speculators in real estate for the pur-
pose of buwinq and selling lands, and that it Is not
19
necessary to the existence of such partnership that it
be evidenced by a written agreement signed by
the partners ; it may be created by parol. It iR not
affected bv the statute of frauds, for the reason that
the real etate is treated and administered in equity
as per-onal property for all the purposes of the part-
nerslhip.
An agreement, by which the plaintiff was to fur-
nish the capital, and defendant to give go much of his
time and labor as was necessary in planting and gather-
ing oyters for the market, the profits of each venture
after deductinf expenses, to be divided equally between
them : held not to make them partners, but merely par-
ties in a joint enterprise. Houseman v. Weir, 15 Abb.
N.C. 415. But a joint enterprise, whether or not tech-
nically a Tartnership, will be enforced and the rights
and liabilities of the parties determined upon the same
principles a- are applie by courts of equity to part-
ner-hip transaftion,. Wilcox v. Pratt, 125 J.Y. 688 ;
King v. Barnes, 109 N.Y. 285 ; Mar-ton v. cGould, 69 N.
Y. 225 ; DVckcman v. Valiente, 42 N.Y. 551 ; Campbell v.
Sherman, 8 N.Y. Supp. 330.
"It is a violation ,f the law for corriorations to
enter into a partnership." People v. Nokth River 8ufar
Refininq Co., 121 \T.Y. 623. Here the defendant "helped
to create an anomalous trust, which is, insubstance and
in fact, a partnership of twenty different corporations'!
I need only to sujget that the parties to a part-
nership contract must be able to conitract ; that the
contract must be valid ; and that the object of the
partnership muzt be lejal.
lTn'ler another rivi~ion of mV subject will be
found much that is pertinent to this division.
Partnerghip as to Third Persons.
The question as to what constitutes a partnership
comes before the courts most frequently where creditors
seek to enforce the liabilities of partners against
persons, in some way connected with the business, to
which they have given credit. The question map be
said to be whether a partnership as to third persons
exists. Such a partnership may result in two ways :
first, where persons are held liable as partners by
reason of sharinq profits ; and secondly, where theVr
are held so liable because of "holding out". "These
are not true partnerships, but mere cases of liability
to certain persons." Bates on Partnership, XVol.I.,
Sec. 3.
Of course, if there is a partnership in f-)ct be-
tw ieen the persons soucjht to be made liable, each member
of the partnership is liable as a partner to third per-
22
sons ; but the converse Is not true. One may have no
right to an accountin!T, and vet may be liable for all
the debtq of the business.
When the object souqht by a plaintiff is the f'ix-
Ing of liability on a person as partner, the first ques-
tion is, is there a partnership in fact ; if not, is
there a partnership as to third persons? The latter
relation results either by sharing profits or by hold-
i n(t out.
Sharing Profits.
"In the first place, it matters not that the de-
fendants meant not to be partners at all, and were not
partners inter Rege. They may be partners as to third
persons, notwithgtanding. And this effect mag result,
thouTh they should have taken pains to stipulate among
theingelves that they will not in any event, hold the
relation of partners. Among the reasons given is this,
whether it he PtronqT or weak : that wha,tever person
shares in the profits of any concern, shall be liable
to creditors for losses also, since he takes a prt of
the fund, which in ,ireat measure is the creditor's Re-
curity for the paynent of the debts to them." Le(-rqett
v. Hyde, 58 iT.Y. 278.
The rule, so lonq in vogue, that a sharin(j of
profits made the sharer liable as a partner to third
persons, was first announced in Grace v. Smith, 2 W.
Bi. 998 (1775). Smith and one Robinson dissolved part-
nerhip, dul5 advertising the fact, on terms by which
Robinson was to take the business and assume the debts
and pay Smith back his original capital and one tfous-
and pounds for profits, and Smith was to let four thous-
and pounds remain in the business for seven years at
five- per cent. In an action by a creditor charging
Smith as a secret partner, DeGrey, J., said : "Every
man who has a share of the profits of a trade ought al-
so tobear hisq share of the loss. If any one takes
part of the profit, he takes a part of the fund which
the creditor relies on for payment.... I think the true
criterion is to inquire whether Smith agreed to share
the profits of the trade with Robinson, or whether he
only relied on those profits a- a fund for payment."
The jury found that the loan was on general personal
security only ; they found for Smith ; and. a new trial
was refused. Hence the case was rightly decided, but
the statements of law contained in the opinion have
had a wide influence. Counoel 1or Plaintiff cited
Bloxham v. Pell and Brooke,(not reported., where under
a similar state of facts it was agreed that Brooke
should give Pell a bond for the amount which Pell had
brouTht into the trade with interest at 5%. Ind fur-
ther that Brooke should pay to Pell 200 pounds per an-
num for six years,as in lieu of the profits of tne
trade. Brooke became a bankrupt. Lord Mansfield
25
held that Pell was a, secret partner. *This tras a de.-5
vice to make more than legal interest of money, and if
it wag not a partnership, tt was a crime. And it shall
not lie in the defendent, Pell's mouth to say, (It is
usury, and not a partnership."
Then followed the case of Waugh v. Carver, 2 H. B1.
23,(1793). Carver and Son, ship-agents at one placee
and (liesler, a ship-agent at another place, aireed to
throw business into each others hands and divide com-
missions and profits, neither to be affected. by the
others losses or liable for his acts. Eyre, L. C. J.,
said that it was plain that the parties were not and
never meant to he partners, but as they took part of
the fund on which creditors rely, they were liable as
partners under Grace v. Smith.
"The argument involved an obvious fallacy, for
first it assumes that the portion of profits which the
defendent takes by so much reduces the resources of
the business ;where-as the preRurmption i.R that the
loan, service or other consideration, in requital of
which he is paid, augmented those resources to the
extent of his share in the dividend ; and, secondly,
if every 'payment by which the funds of the firm are
dilninished rnakeR the payee a partner, then every ser-
vant and agent of the partnership is responsible for
it- obligations---a palpable reductio ad absurduma....
TUnqatisfactorT as was the argument for tho conc!uslor9
nev rtael,-t, it Aas long the law of England that an
interest in the profits of a partnershlip impe e.If a
liability for the partnership obligation., and the
princil,]e w js ef er:,!! y prv~alent '1 the. coi'rt, of
tLC 0co, j1rt. But ii 1 ;30 the rule and the reason
of it underwent a searchingl scrutiny in the flouse of
Lords, unler tho criticiI 1 of Lorr1 ah.e'i!r -
bell and the ex-Chancellors Brouqhm, Cranworth and
Wensleydale, with the result that the doctrine was
?8
a firm Ps a principal, as one tradinq on. his own behalf
as well as in behalf of' others, he is a partner. The
principia'tnodern English decisions repudiate the dis-
tinction bet,,reen paztnerships inter se, and those which
are such only as to third persons in consequence of a
sharing of profits. Bates, I, Sec. 19.
The most prominent feature of the modern English
law may be summed up as follows : A rerson is not lia-
ble as partner to third persons unless he is an actual
partner inter se, the case of holding out of course
apart. Bates, I, Sec. 23.
Jud(Te Folger in Leggett v. Hyde, 58 ti.Y. 280,
say~ 2 "It is claimyed bV the learned counsel for the
appellant, that the rule announced in Grace v. Smith
and Wauqh v. Carver, has beer exploded, and another
rule propounded which shields the appellant. He is
correct so far as the courts in England are concerned.
Cox v. Hickman, 8 -. of L. Cases 268, and Bullen v.
utterly exploded as a principle of English jurispru-
dence. (Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. of L. Cases, 238)."---
Pryor, J. in Wilcox Printing Co. v. Bowker, 27 Pbb.
,q. C. 15',
But a share of gross returns in lieu of compen-
sation wps early held in the English aPAr hot to con-
stitute a liability as partners. It had previously
been decided that sharing groSs receipts did not conr
stitute a partnership inter se. Then a distinction
was made between an agreement to receive as compensa-
tion a part of the profit,; and an agreement to receive
a sum equal to or in proportion to a part of the profitS,
the latter not constituting a partnership. Bates on
Y-rtnership, Uol. 71 See. 13.
The rule that sharing the profits is the criterion
of a partnership h.sR been entirely repudiated in Eng-
land since Cox v. Hickman. The test there is that of
mutual arency ; that is, itf person is connected with
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Sharp, L. R. 1 CoM. P1. 86, affirms that while a, par-
ticipation in the profits is cogent evidence, that the
trade in which the profits wiere made, wag carried on
in part for or in behalf of the person claiminq the
right of participation, yet, that the true ground of
liability is that it has been carried on by persons
actinq in his behalf. Those cases were very peculiar
in their circumstances. After the judgment rendered in
them, the Parliament deemed it needful to enact, that
the advance of money by way of loan to a person in
trade, for a share of the profits, should not, of it-
self, make the leuler responsible as a, partner. (28, 29
Vfic. Oh. 86). If the decisions in the cases cited
went as far as is claimed, it would seem that the act
was supererogatory. Without discussinq those decisio s
and determining jut '1107T far they reach, it is suffic-
ient to say that they are not controlling here ; that
the rule remains in thts State a- it has long been, and
that we should be governed by it here until, as in
England, the legislature shall see fit to abrogate it".
I shall now attempt to present as briefly as pos-
sible the l eading cases prior to Leqgett v. Hyde in
which the question whether sharing profits constituted
a partnership as to third persons, has arisen or is dis-
cu ssed.
Bostwick v. Champion, 11 Wend. 571. A., B. and ('.
ran a line of' staie coaches from Utica to Rochester ;
the route was divided between them into sections, the
occupant of each section furnishing his own carriages
and horses, hiring drivers and paying the expenses of
his own section ; the money received as fare of passen-
gers, deducting therefrom only the tolls paid at turn-
pike gates, was divided among the parties in proportion
to the number of mileq of tie route run by each. An
injury happened to a third person through the negli-
qence of the driver of the coach of A. Held, that a
joint action on the cage at the suit of the party in-
jured lay against B. and C. as well as A. Telson, J.
said, "It may be laid down as an established principle
of law, that whoever participates in the profits of a
trade or business, or has a specific interest in the
profits ttefselves, aR such, becomes chargeable as a
partner with respect to third persons .... It is
clear in this case that all the proprietors have a
community of interest in the profits, and share in
them in proportion to the money, labor and skill 49,-
brought into the business. The proceeds from the en-
tire route are thrown into a common fund and divided.
Each has the benefit of any peculiar or superior ad-
vantaqe which may appertain to one portion of it over
another ; and it was well said by Mr. Justice Bayley,
in Langjdon v. Pointer, 12 Com. L. R. 221, that the
horses and driver are found b T one to do the work of
all, and for the benefit of all', under such circun-
stances. (Is not this the test proposed b T Cox v.
Hickmrr?) . . . rhe defendants as among themselves, by
the terms of their agreement, all the provisions of
which are binding upon thern in relation to one another,
may not be partners, and may be liable to eachother
the same as if their interests were several. This
private agreement or understanding, however, can in no
way vary the rights of third persons or the public,
legally flowing from the general arrangement under
which they hold themselves out as jointly interested,
and by which they participate in the profits of the
concern."
This cage was affirmed in Champion v. Bostwick,
18 Wend. 175. Here the court said : 'It is not neces-
sary to constitute a partnership that there should be
any property constituting the capital stock which shall
be jointly owned by the partners. But the capital may
consist in the mere use of property owned by the in-
dividual partners separately. It iq sufficient to
conIstitute a partnership if the parties agree to have
a joint interest in, and to share the profits and loss-
es arising from the use of property or skill, either
separately or combined. Here the capital stock which
each contributed or agreed to contribute to the joint
concern, was the horses, carriages, harness, drivers
etc., which were necessary to run hif part of the route;
and to be fed, repaired and paid at his own expense.
The only debts or expenses for which they were to be
jointly liable as between themselves, were the tolls
upon the whole line ; and the joint profits wnich they
were to divide, if any remained after paying the tolls,
was the whole passage money reueived upon the entire
line. . . . There is a class of cases in which it has
been held, that a person whe merely receives a compen-
sation for his labor, in proportion to the gross prof-
its of the business in which he is employed, is not a
partner witn his employer even as to third persons.
The distinction appears to be betuieen the stipulation
for a compensation proportioned to the profits, and a
stipulation for an interest in such profits so as to
entitle him to an account as a partner. 1 Rose R. 91.
A distinction which Lord Eldon says is so thin that he
cannot state it as settled upon due consideration.
But, he says, it is clearly settled as to third per-
Rons, though he regrets it, that if a man stipulate
that as the reward of his labor he shall have, not a
specific interest in the busine.ss, but a gTiven sum of
money, even in proportion to the quantum of profits,
that will not make him a partner ; but if he agreed
for a part of the profits as such, givinq him a riqht
to an account thougih having no property in the capital,
he is as to third persons a partner ; and no arrange-
ment between the parties themselves can pprevent it."
Burkle v. Eckhart, 1 Denio 337 (1845). A firm of
merchants enfgagTed in general husiness and trading, a-
mon(T other things, in provi.ions, employed a third
Terson to attend to the purchasing and forwarding of
produce, who wag to act, under the orders of the firm,
and have as compensation for his services one fourth
of the profits arising out of the purchase and sale of
produce ; Held, that the person thus employed was not
a partner in the business, even in respect to third
parties. Bronson, Oh. J.: "It is quite clear that
there was no partnership as between the parties to this
arrangement, and I thint there was none in relation to
third persons. There was no community of interest in
the capital stack ; and Eckhart did no act as prin-
cipal trader, but only as the agent or servant of Gibb
, Co. He wag not clothed with the usual powers, rights
or duties of a partner ; but was subject to the orders
of his employers. He had nothing to do with the losses,
except as they affected the profits out of which he
was to be paid ; and he was only to take a -hare of
the profits in the lieu of wages, or as a mode of get-
tinff compensation for his services. . . So far as this
court is concerned, it has been settled, that a mere
agent or servant, who is to obey orders and has no in-
terest in the capital stock, will not be a partner, ev-
on as to third persons, merely because he is to be
compensated for his services, by receiving a share of
the profits which may arise from the business in which
he is employed. It is undoubtedly true as a General
rule, that a communion of' profits will make men part-
ners, and dra'T after it a liability for losses. But
it is abundantly settled that that rule is not univer-
sal ; and the exception which will best reconcile the
cases, is least liable to abuse, and is so distinctly
marked that it can be easily administered, is that
which allo,,!s one man to employ another as a subordi-
nate in his business, and agree to pay him out of the
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profit-, if any shall arise, without giving the party
employed the rights, and subjectinq him to the labil-
ities of a partner." This case wasaffirmed in 3 Nt.Y.
132 .
AR early as Vanderburg v. Hull, 20 Wend. 70, it
was decided that a share of the profits for compensa-
tion did not make a servant liable as a partner. In
that cage a person was employed as an agent of a partic-
ular business at a salary of $300. per annum ; in addi-
tion thereto he was to have a contingent interest in
one-third of' the profits ; he was not to be answerable
for losses. Held, that he was not a partner, and
therefore a competent witness in an action broufht by
his employer.
Merrick v. 1ordon, 20 NT.Y. 93. PL firm, carriers
upon the _\Te 'T York canals, agreed with a firm of car-
riers upon the (Ireat Lakes for a division in fixed pro-
portions of the total freight which should be received
for the carria(fe of Goods, which haxing been carried
over either ol' the routes should be carried ower the
other durinf the ;eason of nPViqation. Held, no part-
ner.iOip between the firms, or in respect to third per-
"'ons. Oomstock, J. said : "This cage is distinquish-
able fcrom Bostwick v. Champion. In the latter case
all the fare from passengers received by any of the
parties was to be a common fund and divided according
to the number of miles in the section
of the line which each occupied. This formed a union
in the entire budine-s of carrying which any and all
of the partners conducted. Consequently, if the occu-
pant of one of the sectiions should take a passenger
over his own part of the route, who was carrief no
farther, or should take one over a part of bi- section,
the fare would go into the generl fund and be subject
to division. . . . . The contract in thig case was
simply that where either of the parties took goods
from the other at Oswego, the termination of both
lines---the goods beinq brought to that place by one
or the other under freig/hting contracts---and car-
ried thence in one direction to New fork, Albany, or
Troy by the canals or Hudson river, and in the other
by the lakes to the ports situated thereon, the gross
earnings on those qoods should be divided. Entire
freights over both lines of conveyance were in con-
templation, and those only ; and the division was to be
made accordin T to the value of the service which it
was supposed each party must perform in earning those
freights. The arraniement was, therefore, in princi-
ple, like the very common one which is made between
different lines of railroad. Arrangements are often
made between different companies having lines which
connect, adjusting fare or freight on passengers and
goods between distant points, and assigning to each a
share in the gross earnings according to the service
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which each performs in producing the result. No case
has tTone the length of holding that an agreement of
this nature creates, 9, partnership ; and if we were to
lay down such a doctrine now, It would he establishing
a class of partnerships hitherto unknown to the law."
Manhattan Brass Co.v. Sears, 4. NT. Y. 797. This
caqe is often inaptly cited. The judge prefaces his
opinion thus : OTo constitute one a partner, as to thirA
persons, it is not necesary that he should agree to
share in the losses of the business. Sharing in the
profits is sufficient.' Defendent had contracted for
an undivided quarter interest in a patent right. The
court found "all the elements of a partnership, as
claimed by any writer:; sharing in the profits ; sharing
in the loRses, at least to the extent of $4,000, the
repayment of the whole of which depended upon the
profits ; the right to inspect the books ; a co-mnmon
interest in the stock of the company..... It is plain-
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ly a partner.hip as to third persons, even though ex-
pregly. agreed that it should not be so between them-
selves. TPhe best position that can be claimed by de-
fendent, Sears, is that this is . special or limited
partnership, as between the parties thereto. In such
a cage it is general as to the public, or our statute
on that subject would be superfluous." Undoubtedly
the actual relation, which the parties had assumed
towards each other, was that of partners.
Ontario Bank v. Hennessv, 48 N.Y. 552. " The
agreement executed by the defendents made them part-
ners. It provided for a joint business, to which
McDonald was to (give his personal attention, and
jliennesgy was to furnish $800. This $800 was not a
loan, but was to be furnished as capital, as no pro-
vision is male for its repayment. H., however wag
to incur no further risk nor assume any further re-
sponsibility than the $800. This was placed in
peril and miht be lost, and if the Ioss should be
(Treater than the $800, M. was, as between him and H.,
to bear it. If there w"as any net profit, H. wl to
have one-quarter of it. It thus appears that H. was
to share in the profits of the business as profits,
not as a compensation for wages he wag to earn, or
interest or monev loaned to M., but in consideration
of his share of capital invested and imperiled in the
jointbusiness. Whatever the intentions of the parties
may have been, this, as to the third person, made him
a partner. Here, within the meaniniT of the authori-
ties, was a communion of profits, and hence a partner-
ship."
4n agTreement, by which one employed to purchase
(rain is to receive for his service one-half the
profits realized on the Grain purchased, does not con-
stitute him a partner so as to make him a necessary
party plaintiff in an action broujht by his employer
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upon a contract in reference t.o the grain so purchased.
Lewis v. Greider, 51 N.Y. 231.
Kent said : "The test of partnership is a communi-
tT of profit ; a specific interest in the profits, as
profits." 3 Kent's 0omm. p.25, note b. "There have
been from time to time certain exceptions established
to this rule in a broad statement of it ; but the de-
cisions, by which these exceptions have been set up,
still recognize the rule that, where one is interest-
ed in profits, as such, he is a partner as to third
persons. These exceptions deal with the case of an
aqent, servant, factor, broker or employe, who with
no interest in the capital or business, is to be remun-
erated for his services, by a compensation from the
profits or by a compensation measured b. the profits ;
or with that of seamen on whaling or other like voyaies,
whose reimbursment for their time and labor is to fin-
ally depend upon the result of the whole voyage. There
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are other exceptions, like tenants of land, or,a ferry,
or an inn, who are to share with the owners in results,
as a means of compensation for their labor and services.
The decisions which establish these excpptions do not
profess to abrogate the rdle---only to limit it."
Leggett v. Hyde, 58 iT.Y. 280.
In that case Judge FolgTer found the prominent and
important facts to be that defendant and appellant,
Hyde, "loaned the firm a sum of money to be employed as
capital in its business, and that, therefore, he was
entitled to have and demand irom it one-third of the
profits of the business every half-year." H. had
loaned to a firm $2000. to be used in the business for
one year, under an a(greement that he was to receive
one-third of the profits, which were to be settled
half-yearly, and at the end of the year if he did not
conclude to become a partner, he was to be repaid his
$2000. out of the concern. Held, that the money so in-
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vested wat used by the firm for the benefit of #4.;
that he ,,ad an interest in the profits as such, not as
a measure of' compensation, but as a reoult of' the capi-
tal and industry ; and that as to the creditors of the
firm he was a pportner, and jointly liable writh the
others for the partnership debts. OIt wag one-third
of the profits that he was to have, and not a sum in
general, equal to that one-third. So that he was to
take it as profits, and not as an amount due ; not as
a measure of compensation, but as a result of the cap-
ital and industry."
To ,me this distinction seems superfine, ipuacti-
cal ; and necessarily, a decision one wav or tthe other
must be arbitrary. There is no reason to the rule
laid. down in Waugh v. Carver,etc. The exceptions to it
are numerous. The cases since Leqqett v. Hyde have
(Tone still farther. I shall now endeavor to present
the leading cases since that decision. Instead of dis-
cusging thein in my own words, I shall often let the
judjes who delivered the opinions : eak.
It was observed in the Supreme Court, of Michigan
in the case of Beecher v. Bush, 45 Mich. 188, 195-6,
that in- -New Yorb the doctrine that participation
in profits created the liability of partners had been
cloqd!.y adhered to, and that the courts were hampered
by their own early decisions and had not followed Cox
v. Hickman to the full extent. This statement is ques-
tioned : Bates on Partnership, I., p.27.
ijaTer v. Crawford, 76 N.f. 97. Defendant C.
advanced to defendant G. money to purchase the stock
and fixtures of a business, which (G. qtated he could
pay soon. C. was secured by chattel mortgTage upon the
property, conditioned that the sum loaned should be
paid on demand, qnd 11. agreed to pay over to him one-
hal f of the net receipts of the business. In an action
by a creditor of G., who souqht Lo charTe C. as a part-
47
ner, held, that C. could not be held liable ; that the
I epTal presumption wag, that the share of the recei pts
go paid over was to be applied in pa'tment of the loan.
"Le iqett v. Hyde does not hold that, where money is
loaned and to be refunded absolutely without regard
to profits, a partnership exists. To have that effect
the payment must bepend upon the profits. If the lend-
er is to be paid at all events, the contract does not
create a partnership : Everett v. Coe, 5 Denio 180."
Then, not to have that effect, all that one must do,
is to stipulate for a return of the money at all events.
Iq there much left of the"shar-nq profits" test? If
one does not stipulate for a return of the money ad-
vanced, he does not make a loan ; he contributes cap-
ital ; and by agreement he is entitled to a share of
the profits. Then I think the courts in this State
would hold that the parties to the agreement were part-
ners amonq themselves.
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Plchard.on v. }{uihitt, [3 N.Y. 5. Defendant ff.
entered into an agreement with B. Bros. ,& Co., by which
that firm a,reed to maniifacture and deliver to ff. 200
lumber wagrons ; he ajreed to advance fifty dollars on
each ; the waqon, were to he sold and H. to receive
one-fourth of the profits and his advance, with inter-
e.t at five and one-fourth per cent. In an action to
charge iH., as a partner, with a debt of the firm, held,
that the a(ureement did not constitute a partnership,
but was a cotitract for -. loan, the provision a- to
profits being merely a mode of providino a conpensa-
tion for the use of' the mo-ey advanced. "In Leggett
v. Hyde, the money was advanced with a view to a part-
nersrlip, and for the benefit of Hyde himself. It was
not a loan , and no interest was to be paid on the same!
It seemR to me that the only way by which Legqett v.
Hyde can he reconciled with the two pr(,ceedinj cas.-s,
is by holding that the defendants in Leggett v. Hyde
were p-artners inter sese tNo doubL theV were.
'he caie oil Burnett v. Snyder, 91 ,N.Y. F50, re-
pudiates the doctrine of Cox v. Hickman. "We have in
this State, says JudqTe /ndreis, "adhered to the general
doctrine established by the earlier EngIish cases, and
althou(Th it proceeds upon reasons which have not been
considerdd entirely satisfactory, it was applied by
this court in the recent ease of Leqnett v. Hfyde, 58
N.Y. 272. But the participation in the profits of a
trade which makes a person a partner as to thirI per-
sons is participation in. the profits as such, under
circumntanceq which jive fiirn a proprietary interest in
the profits before division as principle trader, and
the rigTht to an account a. partner, and a lien on the
partner 'hip assets in preference to individual credi-
tors of the p,rtner, Accordinlg, in this case it was
held, that a contract between one of two or more part-
ners and a third persont with the knowledqe and agsent -
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of the other partners, by which the third person is to
share in the profits and loqses, in the firmn business,
of the parties vith whomn he contracts, does not consti-
tute such a participation in the profits as will. make
the third person a partner, or liable for the partner-
ship debts." "Thus the opinion denier Ilox v. fiickman,
and adopt-e4 it in full immediatL.g after!5?,rds". Bates
on Partnership, I, 27, note 2.
The case of Curry v. Fowler, 87 T.Y. 33, was sim-
ilar in its leadingT aspects to the case of Richardson v.
Hughitt (supra), and folloued its decision.
Ga sidy v. Hall, et al., 97 1T.Y. 159. Defendants,
Hall, Niioll, and Granberry, as parties of the first
part, entered into a contract with. defendant, the Unit-
ed States Reflector Company, which recited that the
parties of the first p.,rt -onternplated aqquminj control
of said comp,ny, when, if ever, they should be satis-
fied that its business, was a profitable one, and that
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it was expedient some arr.nqoroent should be made where-
by that question miiht be determined, in consideration
whereof and of the mutual covenants and agreerments it
wag agreed that the parties of the first part, to enable
the company to fill its orders, for goods manufactured
by the company, should make advances upon aggipnrhent$of
such orders as they shoulde approve ; said parties of
the first part to collect each of the orders so assineA,
and out of the proceeds retain the sum advanced thereon
with interest and a proportion of the profits made by
the company, the saine to be not less than ten per cent
of the face of the order. The company also executed to
H. ~N. and G. a ch2,ttel mortgage upon its property to
secure such advances. In an action to recover for
goods sold to the company, held, that the contract did
not constiLute a copartnership between the parties,
either inter ,ese, or as to third persons. "The case
of Richardson v. Huaqitt is directly in point, the
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a.ne princle is involved and there is a striking an-
alojy in the facts which renderq it .ppllcable to the
question now considered. We are unable to perceive
any Ruch distinction existing between the two cases
a holding
which authorizes that the case cited is not in point."
For my own part, I cannot reconcile this case with
Legqett v. Hvde. In each case money was advanced to a
firm for use in the hiuines of said firm, the parties
in each case advancingT the money contepiplatinq becoming
partners in the future. In Cassidy v. Hall the parties
oi the first part to the aqreement were, out of as-
si.ynel orders when collected, to retain of the proceeds
the sums advanced ,with interest and a proportion of the
profits made by the company. In Leggett v. Hyde, 41;-
the defendant was to receive one-third of the profits,
which w<,re to be settled half-yearly, and at the end
of the year if he did not conclnde to become a part-
ner, he was to be repaid his $2000. out of the concern,
but without interest strictlv as such. The judge in
Richardson v. HuThitt ,avs : "In LefTqett v. 14Vde, the
money wag advanced with a view to a partnership, and
for the benefit of Hyde himself." The same judge in
Eafferr v. Crawford, 76 4.Y. 01, says : "Legg(ett v.
Hyde does not hold that, where money is loaned and to
be refunded aboliutely without refard to the profits,
a partnership -exists. To have that effect, the pay-
ment must depend upon the profits. If the lender is to
be paid at all events, the contract does not create a
partnership." Does not the first quotation apply as
well to Cagsidy v. Hall? Does the second quotation ap-
ply to the facts in Leg(Tett v. Hyde? Was not the $2000.
to be repaid absolutely, not'ithstandingT profits?
Profits were to be received in that case ; why not as
a measure of compensation? To my mind lecause the judge
arbitrarily said that they were to be received as prof-
its. I can only reconcile the caseg discu sad, satis-
factorily to myself, by maintaininq that in Leggett v.
Hyrde the defendants were partners inter se. If they
wer-e not partners inter se, then in the light of subse-
quent recisions the case was, decided erroneously.
In Hacket v. 3tanley, 115 n.Y. 629, tb.e late Chief
Jud(Te Rurfer said : "The application of the rule that
participation in profits renders their recipient a part-
ner in the business froln wkich profits are derived, as
to third persons, has been somewhat reptricted by mod-
ern decisions, but we thinb that the division of prof-
its must Rtill be considered the most important ele-
ment in all contracts by which the true relations of
parties to a business is to be determined. We think
this rule is founded in strict justice and sound policV.
There can be no injustice in itosing upon hhose who
contract to receive the profits of an adventure, a lia-
bility for credit contracted in its aid, and which are
essertial to its successful conduct and prosecution.
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'Phi, liability does:, and ou,[ht not, to dejend upon the
intention of the parties in making their contract to
shield themselves from liability, but upon the ground
that it is against public policy to permit persons to
prosecute an enterprise, which, however successful it
may for a time appear to be, is sure in the end to re-
sult in advantage to its secret promoters alone, and ,
the ruin and di.saster of its creditors and other$con-
nected with it. Expected profits being the motive
which indulces the prosecution of all commercial and
busines. enternrises, their accumulation and retention
in business is essential to their success ; and if per-
sons are permitted, by secret agreement, t~o appropriate
thern to tneir own use and th.row the liabilities in-
curred in producing them upon those who receive only a
portion of the benefits, not onl.r is a door opened to
the perpetration of frauds, but such fraud are ren-
dered inevitable. Exceptions to the rule are, however,
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found.in cases where a share in profits is contracted
to be paid, as a measure of compensation to e, rnployees
for services rendered in the business, or for the use
of money-, loaned In aid of' the enterprise ; but where
the 4,,(Treernent extends beyond this and provides for a
proprietzr'r interest in the profits as a compensation
for money advanced and time and services bestawed, as a
principle in its prosecution, we think that the rule
still requires the party to be held as a partner." Cew-
tainly, the division of profits must still be consid-
ered an importgnt element in considerinq the true re-
lation of parties to a business. But it is not too
much to say,, that the doctrine that a person takes a
share of the profits on which creditors rety, and
therefore should be liable as a. partner, is not only
restricted but well-ni(Th exploded in this State. The
judces may recite the ol rule, but they do 'not apply
it. Virtually, the rule of Cox v. Hickman Au applica-
ble in this btate. Thi s cage of Fackett v. Stanley,
was one wherein defendants entered into an agreement
by which, in consideration of the loan of $750. from
S. to (I. "for use in the business of heatifig, ventilat-
ing", etc., which sum was secured by the note of 7., by
the asgi-nment of a policy of insurance and by chattel
mortgages, and in further consideration of' the Rervice s
of S. in securing! sales, and any other sums he miqht at
his option advance, G. agreed to divide equally with
him the net profits of the bisiness. The court said:
"We thinb such an agreement, vrithin all authorities,
constitutes a partnership ag to third parties. By it
Stanley hadt an interest in the general business of the
concern ; a right to require a quarterly account of its
transactions ; authority to make contracts, in its be-
half, and an irrevocable right to demand one-half of
tne profits of the business. That the ori(Tina1 loan
was secured to be repaid does not preclude the conc]u-
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sion that they were partners, for it is entirely corn-
petent for one partner to guarantee anothe r against
loss, in whole or in part, in the partnership husiness,
if the parties aqree.0 Without doubt, the, parties were
partners in fact, and so were liable.
It is the law of this State, as declared by the
Court of Appeals, that a ricjht to a share in the prof-
its in compensation for services rendered to the part-
nership does not involve a liability for the- partner-
ship enrragements. 'Ind so of a loan of moiwy to trie
partnership, for a share of the profits. There is no
difference in principle between the letting of a chat-
tel and the loan of money or the hire ofservices."
Wilson Printing Ink Company v. Bowker, 27 Alt. t.C.153.
Partnerghip by Holdinq Out.
Mr. Parsons in his work on Partnership, page 119,
says : "Where a creditor sueq a firm, and Reeks to put
the liability of a partner upon one who is only a noin-
is
innal partner, itAa somewhat difficult question whether
the plaintiff can recover without proof tiat rme himsel f
believed the person whom he seeks to charge to be a
partner. The authorities on this question aave far from
unanimous, some holding that one put forth t.o the world
as a partner, is liable as such to every creditor of
the firm ; while others hold that he is thus liable on-
ly because he waq a partner in fact and in interest,
or because the plaintiff regarded him as one, and dealt
with the firm in Rome degree, at least , on his credit.
Perhaps a reasonable rule miqht be stated thus : Where
one is held forth to the wvorld as a partner, the first
question is, was he so held out by his ot authority,
consent or connivance, or by his neqlig-enc@. If by his
authority, consent or connivance, the presumption is
absolute that he was so held out to every cred itor or
customer. If so held out by his negligence only, -q-e
he should be held only to a creditor who had been ac-
tually misled thereby."
The above rxle is approved by the court in the
case of Poillon v. 1Secor, 61 NT.Y. 462. Here defendant,
for a valuable consideration, authorized the use of
his name in the copartnership, as if he was a member
thereof ; held, that he was liable as a partner to a
subsequent creditor of the firm, although the creditor
was ignorant of the arrangement, or that the name rep-
resented such nominal partner, and did not give credit
on the faith of his apparent connection with the firm.'
"The sound rule would seem to be, that a person who
deliberately agrees that his nane shall be used in a
partnership, must be conclusively presumed to intend
the consequences which naturally flow from such an act.
It would be contrarg to public convenience to require
affirmative proof that dealerg with the firm knew who
wag represented by the fictitious name."
8everal persons enaqed in an enterprise, one of
them aqreeing to assist by advancing money, and to
share in the losses, if any, buit not to receive any
part of the profits, which are to be divided among
the others exclusively. Althougrh such one is not to
be deemed a partner as between the others and himself,
nevertheless, if he holds hirnself out or allow himh-
self to be held out as a partner, to a third person,
who under the belief that he is such, enters into a
contract wTith them, he is liable on such contract.
Moss v. Jeroie, 10 Boslv. 220.
Where a partnership is publicly and notoriously
known, all the partners are responsible for the con-
tracts of each, within the scope of the partnership,
until public notice of the dissalution is given ; but
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it is otherwise of a dormant partner. fctual ditsolu-
tion without notice will protect him. Kelly v. Hurl-
burt, 5 Ocw.. 534.
Where the relations of a partner to his copart-
ners have been terminated, yet his name was continued
in the na;ne and ;tyle of the firm formed by his former
copartners with his knowledge, sanction and approval,
held, that he was liable on the contract and obliga-
tions of the firm so using his narne as if he had ac-
tually continued as a member and partner thereof, "as
to all creditors who had rtealings with them, without
notice of their actual relationsto eachother." Free-
man v. Falconer, 44 ,N.Y. @ity Sup. Ct. 132.
Publication of the notice of the dissolution of a
partnership in a newspaper, at the place where the bus-
iness is carried on, is not sufficient to relieve a
retiring partner from liability for subsequent trans-
actions in fthe firm name with one having dealings with
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the firm prior to the dissolution ; in such case no-
tice must be brourht goqe to the dealer, or it must
appear that facts came to his knowledge sufficient to
advise him, or give him reason to believe that a disso-
lution has taken place. Ikustin v. Holland, 69 N.Y.571.
De facto Corporations.
Under my subject I might treat of this phase : the
ltability of members of a de facto corporation. But
this would lead me into fields not contemplated, into
regions foreign to my purpose. Moreover, this subject
ha, been ably discussed in a thesis by Henry Lake Wood-
ward, '91, who, in his recapitulation, says : "I think
the following propositions, founded in reason and es-
tablished by authority, may be safely laid down with
reasonable certainty of maintianing them :
1. Persons, who, by contractinff with a de facto
corporation, recognize and acknowledge its corpormte
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capacity to so contract, are estopped froi &fterwards
denying such corpor:*te capacity, and as to them it
stands upon the same footing ;-s a corporation de jure;
2. Persons who have not so estopped themselves
may, in any proceeding where it would be pertinent,
question the reqularitv of the corporation collateral-
ly, and to them the members may be made liable indirvid.
ually as copartners or joint tort-feasors, as thte case
may be%
